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Résumé
Dès les années d’inter guerres, le phénomène des réfugiés
dans le monde a commencé à susciter l’intérêt oscillant des
gouvernements nationaux. Cependant, ce n’est qu’avec la
mise sur pied du  – il y a de cela un demi-siècle – que
les gouvernements ont été amenés à reconnaître, un peu
malgré eux, que la tâche de s’occuper du phénomène des
réfugiés nécessitait une structure institutionnelle ainsi
qu’un effort multilatéral, continue et sérieux, de la part de
la communauté internationale.
Depuis sa fondation, le rôle du , son approche
opérationnelle et, selon certains observateurs, son mandat
même, ont changé de manière très nette. Les gouvernements
qui sont souvent hésitants dans leur soutien à de telles
modifications, ont tout de même fini par soutenir les efforts
du  afin d’éviter que ne se répande l’instabilité politi-
que et que ne se produisent les bouleversements économi-
ques de régions tout entières et le désespoir humain à
grande échelle qui en sont trop souvent le résultat.
Cet article examine le degré de succès qu’à eu le  à
s’occuper des flots grandissants de réfugiés et le prix politi-
que et fiscal qu’il a fallu payer pour y arriver, spécialement
à la lumière des priorités changeantes des gouvernements
qui, précisément, sont les maîtres contrôlant les affaires
budgétaires et les politiques de cet organisme des Nations
Unies. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, l’article identifie les
raisons expliquant les responsabilités accrues du ,
analyse son travail important d’intervention et examine
son approche opérationnelle qui change constamment.
Abstract
The world’s refugee phenomenon attracted oscillating levels
of interest from governments as early as the inter-war era.
Only with the establishment of  a half-century ago,
however, did governments reluctantly acknowledge that
managing the refugee phenomenon required an institu-
tional structure and a genuine, continuous, multilateral
effort by the international community.
Since the founding of , its role, operational
approach, and, according to some observers, even its
mandate have changed remarkably. Governments, fre-
quently wavering in their support for these modifications,
have at least begrudgingly endorsed ’s efforts in
order to limit the spread of political instability, which too
often resulted in regional economic turmoil and widespread
despair.
This paper analyzes how effectively and at what political
and fiscal cost  has dealt with intensifying refugee
flows in light of shifting priorities of governments, them-
selves the policy and budgetary masters of this  body. To
achieve this, the reasons behind ’s expanded respon-
sibilities are identified, the agency’s important advocacy
work is analyzed, and its expanded role and constantly
altering operational approach are examined. Despite the
innumerable obstacles that have confronted the agency over
the past half century, the conclusions suggest that at least
partial success has been achieved.
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Malgré les innombrables obstacles qui ont confronté l’agence
au cours des cinquante dernières années, les conclusions
suggèrent qu’un succès partiel a tout de même était atteint.
The constant change and dynamic character of in-ternational political phenomena are widely ac-cepted among students and practitioners working
in all aspects of international relations. A second view, just
as widely held, is that, despite the chronic tension that pro-
moted hostility and distrust, the forty years of the cold war
provided a semblance of order and relative stability within
the international system. Yet, even during those years of
bipolar dominance when a kind of predictability prevailed,
and certainly throughout the final decade of the century,
the issues demanding and receiving attention from gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations did not re-
main static but rose and fell on agendas in accordance with
continually altering perceptions of urgency. At the same
time, what were seen as potential or actual threats to state
security increased, moving from the traditional primary
concern for physical danger posed by military actions, to a
growing sense of unease over a host of matters, formerly
thought of as “low politics,” such as competition over trade,
anxiety over environmental problems, and, most signifi-
cantly for this paper, massive involuntary cross-boundary
population movements.
As early as the period preceding the outbreak of World
War ii in Europe, but even more so during the past fifty
years, governments collectively show varying levels of in-
terest in what is now routinely referred to as the refugee
phenomenon. The motives behind this escalating degree
of concern are complex but include the desire to limit and
restrict political instability, which regularly contributes to
economic turmoil and profound humanitarian despair.
In the aftermath of World War ii, the international com-
munity established machinery to repatriate or integrate
hundreds of thousands of persons—primarily Europeans,
displaced as a result of the war—into new would-be home-
lands, Subsequently, governments had to reluctantly ac-
knowledge that the “refugee problem” was not going to be
eliminated but rather showed indications of intensifying.
International efforts then turned to managing and, where
possible, limiting the extent of this unwanted involuntary
migration. After substantial debate on the creation of more
than just a temporary agency to deal specifically with the
international refugee situation, on December , , the
United Nations General Assembly (ga) adopted Resolu-
tion  and established the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (), which formally
began operations in .  This significant multilateral or-
ganization is now a half-century old and continues to con-
front a host of seemingly intractable humanitarian and po-
litical issues, many having their origins in the era in which
the agency was still in its infancy.
At the outset, ’s mandate was quite limited. Put
succinctly, the agency’s purpose was to encourage govern-
ments to provide fair and just treatment to genuine refu-
gees. To do this, governments were encouraged to accede
to the newly drafted Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees. When states adhered to it, it would provide a
degree of legal protection, including a series of rights such
as asylum but also additional entitlements that enabled
refugees to seek employment and education, and to qualify
for social welfare.  , therefore, would work not only
to have governments ratify the Convention, but would also
monitor state behaviour to ensure adherence to the provi-
sions of that document. The ga resolution creating the Of-
fice also charged it with the daunting task of seeking per-
manent solutions to the world’s refugee problem. The ap-
proaches subsequently adopted have focused upon three
options: voluntary repatriation, integration into the states
where refugees had been granted asylum, and permanent
resettlement in willing third countries.
During its first decade,  attained the characteris-
tics of a permanent structure. First, the High Commissioner
convinced the ga that  should be permitted to so-
licit voluntary financial contributions to assist refugees
when no other means of support were available. Second,
an advisory committee of interested governments was es-
tablished to counsel the High Commissioner on how to
manage and utilize these still small voluntary contributions
from governments. Third, the advisory committee gradu-
ally evolved into an executive committee with an expanded
membership, which accepted additional tasks associated
with the overall direction of . By the end of ’s
initial ten years of existence, its concerns had become glo-
bal, as Europe’s refugee situation was surpassed in size and
scope by emergencies in Africa, Asia, and ultimately Latin
America.
The objective of this paper is to trace the evolution and
development of  during its half-century of opera-
tion. The goals are to discuss and analyze how effectively
and at what cost  has dealt with the increasing flow
of involuntary migrants in the light of the shifting govern-
ment priorities of over the past fifty years that have hin-
dered the emergence and maintenance of consensus within
the international community. To achieve this, I first iden-
tify and examine ’s expanded set of responsibilities
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during its lifetime, both in number and scope, and analyze
how that state of affairs has arisen. Next, I focus on ’s
advocacy efforts which, while part of the agency’s original
mandate, have expanded significantly. Finally, drawing
upon these first two segments, the paper provides linkage
between the expanded role of  and the ongoing al-
terations in its structure and its administrative and opera-
tional approach. As part of this analysis, the efforts 
has made to become a more transparent and accountable
entity will receive attention. This paper now turns to the
issue of ’s enlarged or “creeping” mandate.
’s Expanding Responsibilities
Since ’s inception fifty years ago, its activities have
expanded significantly, the result of a combination of two
factors. First, the organization’s goals and purposes have
become more encompassing. Second, the expanded goals
have required the adoption of additional strategies to
achieve those ends. The resolution that created 
clearly limits its tasks to providing legal protection to genu-
ine refugees and to striving towards the eradication of the
refugee phenomenon. Over time, however, the approaches
adopted by the Office to achieve these objectives have be-
come more numerous and complex. It may be that the agen-
cy’s ends and the means adopted to attain those ends have
expanded. The challenge is to try to explain why agency
operations have grown and administrative processes have
altered to the extent that they have.
Specifically, in what areas have ’s mandate and
administrative operations expanded over the past half-
century? As pointed out above, when  was formed,
it was expected to adopt a narrow and clearly delineated
range of activities. One student of ’s early years has
written that “East-West tensions together with Western
disagreements over priorities ensured that the mandate of
 was subject to a highly partisan interpretation while
its operational framework reflected compromise and cau-
tious liberality.”  The Office was authorized to work to-
wards eliminating the refugee phenomenon, an objective
unlikely ever to be attained. The real focus, however, was
on providing international legal protection to persons fit-
ting the Convention’s definition of a refugee. The agency
accordingly sought to have governments accede to this Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees and then at-
tempted to ensure that its provisions were adopted and
adhered to by those countries.
Very early in ’s existence, the High Commissioner,
his small staff, and even a few interested governments rec-
ognized that this limited mandate, if rigidly followed, was
too restrictive to meet the mounting needs of bona fide
refugees. When in excess of , Hungarians fled their
homeland in late , following an unsuccessful uprising
against the occupying forces of the Soviet Union, the United
Nation’s ga enlarged ’s mandate by authorizing it
to raise funds to assist these refugees and to generally coor-
dinate care and maintenance efforts. By , having gained
permission to solicit voluntary financial contributions,
another ga resolution permitted  to contract out
programs to non-governmental organizations and subse-
quently to government agencies to provide material assist-
ance to refugees beyond Europe, where states of asylum
were unable or unwilling to meet basic refugee needs.
Throughout the next three decades, ’s operations
expanded constantly as the number of Convention refu-
gees rose substantially, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, where developing countries could not provide
life’s necessities. This enormous rise in forced migration
was caused in large part by the increase in generalized vio-
lence. Specifically, external aggression, intensifying inter-
nal conflicts such as civil wars and massive violation of hu-
man rights—all compelling populations to flee—could not
be entirely ignored by the international community. As
refugee numbers mounted, ’s strenuous fundraising
initially resulted in millions then tens of millions of dol-
lars being made available by government contributions to
cover costs of contracting other agencies within and out-
side the  system to dispense care and maintenance as-
sistance. In recent years, contrary to the intent of its found-
ers, the Office itself has become an operating agency in the
field, augmenting the work of the contracting organizations.
The most significant extension of the Office’s mandate
came during the nineties when, through still another 
resolution, it was authorized to provide protection as well
as care and maintenance to persons who were not refugees
in the rigid sense of the term as defined by the Conven-
tion, but who were in refugee-like situations. An indica-
tion that such an expansion in eligibility criteria was being
considered came with a report prepared for the  ses-
sion of the Executive Committee. The background paper
stated that the mounting humanitarian emergencies “un-
derlined to some extent the need for supplementing tradi-
tional protection notions and approaches with protection
activities in new areas.”  The report urged  to forge
responses to the massive population displacement that
would be innovative and practical, balancing humanitar-
ian concerns with political realism, and states’ interests with
the rights and needs of refugees and persons in refugee-
like circumstances.
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One category of persons formerly outside the mandate,
but now standing to receive assistance from this broadened
outlook, was internally displaced people. To elaborate, one
of the criteria for being classed as a refugee according to
the  Convention is that such persons had to be outside
their state of origin or habitual residence. This alteration
in ’s mandate has permitted the agency to assist “in-
ternally displaced persons.” Thus, people encountering per-
secution and threats to their lives may receive  pro-
tection even though they have not, possibly for reasons
beyond their control, fled their homelands. This condition
prevailed during the nineties in a number of countries in-
cluding Somalia, several states in the Great Lakes region of
East Africa, and in the former Yugoslavia. Reporting to the
 session of the Executive Committee,  explained
the extension in its operations as follows: “’s role
over the past forty years has demonstrated that the man-
date is resilient enough to allow or require adaptation by
 to new, unprecedented challenges through new
approaches.” The report went on to assert that 
would continue to seek specific endorsement from the 
secretary-general or the ga where “these activities involve
a significant commitment of human, financial and mate-
rial resources.” The following year, as if to legitimize still
further the expanding mandate,  wrote, “The ga and
Executive Committee have expressed their support for
’s efforts to explore new options and undertake new
protection activities . . . consistent with the mandate.”
Referring directly to the plight of internally displaced per-
sons, the document stated that they would be assisted
“where it has been practically and morally untenable to
make distinctions as to who should receive humanitarian
assistance or protection on the basis of legal mandates de-
rived from prior status rather than current need.” This
same document declared that the state in which persons
have been internally displaced must concur in ’s
activities but, on a number of occasions where legitimate
authority has not been present, the agency has still initi-
ated activities, often with the support of other  special-
ized agencies.
The final example of ’s expanding mandate to be
cited here, although others of similar importance could
certainly be added, concerns monitoring the welfare of refu-
gees who have been repatriated, possibly prematurely. More
frequently now than in the past,  personnel, encour-
aged by some Executive Committee member governments,
are endeavouring to limit expenses where possible by urg-
ing refugees to return to their homelands. While all organi-
zations and governments associated with the refugee phe-
nomenon are eager to see an end to protracted population
displacement, conditions in the states of origin are often
still politically fragile, and conflict may not have entirely
concluded. No doubt the tragic slaughter in Rwanda in 
and the subsequent general turmoil and anarchy in the
Great Lakes region of East Africa accounts, to some de-
gree, for the intensifying anxiety about the fate of newly
repatriated refugees. In a document prepared for the Ex-
ecutive Committee in ,  did assert that it has
had “a legitimate concern for the welfare of returnees . . .
and it is given effect through monitoring their safe and ef-
fective re-integration into their country of origin.”  Gov-
ernments’ increased use of temporary rather than perma-
nent asylum for refugees and the withdrawal of this pro-
tection, forcing repatriation when it may have been inap-
propriate, or at least premature, may also have caused
 to try to monitor situations in the homeland—a
task it had not formerly attempted. Yet, unlike the decision
to provide assistance to internally displaced persons for
which numerous authorizations can be found, evidence for
the formal authorization of  to undertake system-
atic monitoring of returnees is scarce. According to one
source, the monitoring has, in fact, been very selective and
sporadic, at best.  Representatives of  and non-
governmental organizations (s) with field staff oper-
ating in many conflict-filled regions agree that there may
be a need to observe conditions in some states to which
refugees have been repatriated.
Throughout the past decade, there has been a qualita-
tive change in the political environment in which 
operates. “The agency appears to be under increasing pres-
sure to promote repatriation as a durable solution to the
problems of mass population movement.”  In addition,
the states providing the sanctuary had expected this assist-
ance to be only temporary, but to local authorities scram-
bling for adequate resources for the indigenous popula-
tion, let alone any foreign refugees, it feels interminable.
The extent of frustration when combined with undeniable
humanitarian concern can be sensed in the following quo-
tation from an  document:
Many refugees have not been able to repatriate voluntarily.
Neither have they been able to integrate locally. Nor have they
been resettled elsewhere. Formidable crises and emergencies
have hardened into impenetrable and seemingly deadlocked
dilemmas, resisting or failing to attract determined and con-
certed international solutions.
As recently as the forty-ninth session of ’s Ex-
ecutive Committee, in October , reference continued
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to be made to the potential and/or actual danger confront-
ing returnees, especially women and children, who consti-
tute almost three-quarters of most refugee movements.
Similarly, at this same session, government delegates and
 staff alike expressed their ongoing concern for per-
sons internally displaced but not yet receiving any protec-
tion or assistance from any organization, governmental or
non-governmental.
These examples of a broadening and deepening 
mandate are not exhaustive but illustrative only. Yet, they
do provide the reader with a sample of the growing opera-
tions and indicate why alterations in administrative struc-
tures and managerial approaches have been necessary, a
subject turned to in a later segment of this paper.
Linking Refugee Protection with Intensifying
Advocacy
Each year, before ’s Executive Committee meets,
officials and member government representatives select a
theme for discussion. In , “strengthening partnership
to ensure protection” was the focus. Truly, protection lies
at the heart of ’s mandate. “Protection encompasses
all activities aimed at restoring the human dignity of refu-
gees, safeguarding their rights, and seeking durable solu-
tions to their problems.”  From its earliest years, in an ef-
fort to protect persons falling within its mandate, the agency
has advocated on their behalf. That advocacy has taken a
variety of forms and, throughout the past five decades, has
expanded significantly. The scope and priority given to
encouraging protection by governments has become enor-
mously important, indeed. The longest standing of the ad-
vocacy objectives pursued by the agency has centred on
persuading governments to accede to the two primary in-
ternational refugee protection instruments: the  Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees, and its  Pro-
tocol. Acquiring those accessions has not been a simple task.
Even as the agency passes its fiftieth birthday, the goal that
 and non-governmental organizations concerned
about the welfare of refugees would like to have reached—
universal adherence to the international instruments—has
eluded them. Not surprisingly, liberal democratic govern-
ments—frequently but not always far from refugee-
producing circumstances, and in a better position to effec-
tively regulate the entry of aliens—were the first to adhere
to the instruments. In marked contrast, states in refugee-
producing neighbourhoods and with unresponsive, unac-
countable governments have often rejected ’s efforts
to have them become signatories. As recently as this past
decade,  efforts to acquire accessions continued to
focus on governments in the Middle East, Asia, and
Oceana.  The disappointments notwithstanding,  gov-
ernments were parties to both instruments, as 
reached its half- century mark.
Even when governments have signed on to the interna-
tional instruments, this does not, in many instances, end
’s advocacy work with those authorities. Too fre-
quently, according to the agency, governments fail to abide
by some of the major provisions of the Convention or its
Protocol. Since the origins of , it has acknowledged
that a major portion of its protection work has been to
ensure that the provisions of the Convention are incorpo-
rated into legislation in states that have adhered to this in-
ternational instrument. In a document prepared for the
 session of the Executive Committee,  asserted
that the Convention “reflected the determination of the
international community to protect and assist vulnerable
groups of persons within the framework of international
law and on the basis of international solidarity.”  The docu-
ment went on to explain that, despite these arrangements
and understandings, “the refugee problem today is bigger
and more complex than ever.”  Thus, advocacy has had to
be intensified as the available resources and the political
will are no longer adequate to meet refugee needs. Gov-
ernments have come to see mass population shifts as un-
wanted immigration rather than genuine refugee move-
ments. In a report prepared for the  meeting of ’s
Executive Committee, the view was expressed that the
agency was “not only confronted with a refugee situation
of broadening scope and deepening complexity, but also
with an increasing reluctance of states to grant the neces-
sary protection within the agreed international frame-
work.”
’s constant awareness of its mandate to pursue
solutions to the global refugee problem has caused it to
intensify its advocacy programs in an effort to convince
governments to adopt programs and policies that support
overall assistance to refugees, as well as to persons in refugee-
like situations. In its attempt to raise awareness and alter
restrictive attitudes of governments and publics towards
refugees,  has constantly emphasized that its objec-
tives and programs are purely humanitarian, having no
political goals whatsoever.
From time to time,  has indicated that it would
favour additional international global instruments to sup-
plement the Convention and its Protocol. Such instruments
would address the limitations of the  Convention and
should ideally be treaties or conventions rather than mere
declarations or resolutions, which are not enforceable.
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At the moment, no global instruments focus on the plight
of persons fleeing general violence and/or armed conflict.
It appears, however, that governments have little inclina-
tion to draft and adopt any new protection measures that
specifically focus upon refugees.  In the absence of new
universal instruments,  encourages governments to
also adhere to such regional international protection in-
struments as that of the Organization of African Unity and
the less effective Cartagena Declaration of the Organiza-
tion of American States.  The regional instruments are in-
tended to take into consideration historic and cultural tra-
ditions in specific parts of the world. For example, the
Cartagena Declaration refers to forms of diplomatic asy-
lum that Latin American governments have agreed upon
for more than a half century.
Acquiring accessions by governments to the  Con-
vention and then striving for adherence to the principles
contained in these instruments are only two of many ad-
vocacy tasks with which  is involved. Examples of
the sort of policies and practices relating to refugee welfare
that  strives to modify include unwarranted deten-
tion of refugee claimants in closed holding centres or pris-
ons, refusal by governments to grant even temporary asy-
lum to persons in flight, returning refugees to their states
of origin when their lives would be endangered, and pre-
venting persons from seeking gainful employment or their
children from attending school. It also endeavours to pre-
vent physical and sexual abuse and intimidation, particu-
larly of women and girls. Discouraging the use of refugee
children as soldiers has also become a part of ’s ad-
vocacy approach. Addressing these and other equally seri-
ous concerns has been frustrating, time-consuming, and
frequently unsuccessful. ’s advocacy pursuits are
sometimes complicated by a desire to press these matters
with governments without alienating or annoying them to
the extent that their annual financial contributions, needed
so much, will be decreased or even cancelled.
Arbitrary detention and refoulement—the act of forci-
bly returning refugees to their homelands—are especially
worrying to agency officials and head the list of ills upon
which advocacy is focused. When seeking to liberalize de-
tention policies that governments have implemented,
 has asserted that physical confinement should be
used only in exceptional instances and not as the norm.
According to the agency, governments should avoid closed,
prison-like camps surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled
by armed troops and guard dogs.  Imprisonment and/or
refoulement have become increasingly prevalent as more
and more governments interpret the mass shifts in popu-
lation as little more than attempted immigration through
the back door. While  acknowledges that, given the
principles of classical sovereignty, states have the undeni-
able right to control their borders and determine eligibil-
ity for entry, governments are inclined to be inflexible and
illiberal, erecting obstacles in the paths of persons seeking
sanctuary. As the century concluded,  felt compelled
to step up its advocacy initiatives as, in its view, states dem-
onstrated an increasingly “narrow interpretation of their
international obligations and humanitarian responsibili-
ties.”
Another dimension of ’s advocacy work revolves
around encouraging governments to establish fair and eq-
uitable processes for determining refugee status. 
representatives have, therefore, endeavoured to see that
governments put more humane status-determination pro-
cedures into binding legislation and have offered their serv-
ices to instruct government officials unfamiliar with the
issues that relate to determining valid refugee claims. In
many countries, including Canada for several years, the
agency’s representative, a quasi-diplomatic official, is part
of the determination process, who has access to the refugee
claimant files and, on occasion, even sits with the status-
determination panels.
During recent years, the High Commissioner, with
 officials, has urged governments to work with
 to establish mechanisms that provide early warn-
ing of potential mass refugee emergencies. Undoubtedly,
the tragic events during  in Rwanda and subsequently
throughout the Great Lakes region of East Africa with their
enormous costs in human lives account, at least partially,
for this undertaking.
Many additional examples of advocacy on behalf of refu-
gees could be discussed. Suffice it here to emphasize that,
in virtually every statement by the High Commissioner and
in almost all documents relating to international refugee
protection, a fervent plea is made to the community of states
to do more to alleviate the intolerable conditions facing
millions of persecuted, dislocated people. Burden-sharing
is a frequent theme in these appeals. Although the speeches
and agency publications adhere to the conventional sani-
tized form of the  system, the profound feeling for the
plight of refugees is still detectable. All this advocacy has
taxed the capacity of  and has contributed to modi-
fications in the operation of the organization and a still
greater need to attract financial contributions for all pro-
grams, as  enters its second half-century.
Volume 19 Refuge Number 5
20
Pressures for Budgetary and Managerial
Modifications
Administrative, managerial, and other operational modi-
fications have been made at  as a result of the con-
ditions and circumstances discussed previously. Even if
fewer demands had been made on  during the past
half-century, some alterations in its operations would still
have likely occurred. To illustrate, the changing interna-
tional political environment, when combined with increas-
ingly shrill, intransigent attitudes and policy preferences
of many governments, has actually intensified the need for
 to adapt. The politicization of policy and decision-
making approaches, particularly the budgetary process, at
the Geneva headquarters has undoubtedly contributed to
the difficulties high commissioners have faced in trying to
implement programs.
Muddling through and ad hoc measures have charac-
terized a large proportion of ’s operations for much
of the agency’s existence. Refugee emergencies, budgetary
shortfalls, and ambiguous signals from member govern-
ments and senior  personnel provided an explanation
and justification for many informal administrative prac-
tices affecting policy and program implementation. What-
ever operational approaches or administrative plans were
utilized,  officials defended them as necessary for
fulfilling the ever-expanding mandate and humanitarian
requirements of the situation.
While many factors have had an impact on the struc-
ture and operations of , budgetary considerations,
controversial at the best of times, certainly head the list.
For all intents and purposes, ’s funds come from
voluntary contributions by governments. The annual
budget for most of the agency’s existence has allocated these
monies into general programs (those dealing with ongo-
ing refugee care and maintenance), or special programs (the
unexpected emergencies that appear to be always with
). Steps are now being taken to unify this budget
process. The agency’s annual budget during the nineties
became large by any measure and appears to be maintain-
ing that level in this new century. Between  and ,
the annual budget took an enormous leap, almost doubling
from us million to us. billion. This absolutely un-
expected growth resulted from a succession of huge popu-
lation displacements caused by wars and near wars in Iraq,
Somalia, the Caucasus, Croatia, and Bosnia. Following the
colossal human disaster in Rwanda, ’s budget in 
reached an amazing us. billion.  In the business world,
this rapid growth would be reason for celebration. In the
world of humanitarian agencies, it was a reflection of the
chaos and anarchy that has tragically occurred since the
end of the cold war.
Such an increase in the annual budget had  en-
tering a totally new league. Not surprisingly, as the budget
has grown, monitoring by the approximately fifty govern-
ments, now members of the agency’s Executive Commit-
tee, has substantially increased. These governments have
demanded a greater degree of accountability and transpar-
ency from all departments within . Uncertainty
about meeting the annual financial goal has mounted as
the sums requested by  have become larger. The
unstable, unpredictable funding introduced a previously
unknown level of anxiety among the major donor states
and was a significant factor contributing to the resignation
of two high commissioners within eighteen months in the
early s.
The fiscal crises with the inevitably escalating calls for
controls by member governments resulted in a special
working group being struck in  composed of a few of
the major donor states from the Executive Committee. One
major recommendation brought forward by this group, and
accepted by the Executive Committee, required ’s
budget to be developed on the basis of available voluntary
funds rather than on projected refugee needs.  While this
recommendation brought a greater degree of fiscal respon-
sibility to the budgetary process, it has not by any means
put an end to the ongoing search for funds, or efforts to
streamline the agency’s administrative operations at head-
quarters in Geneva or in the field where programs for refu-
gees are delivered.  has had to try to balance hu-
manitarian concerns with the cold and harsh truths aris-
ing from political and fiscal reality.
Despite an intentional decrease in staff positions at head-
quarters and in the field, as well as other efforts adopted to
limit expenditures, financial issues had become especially
acute by early . The director of ’s Operational
Support Division expressed concern over the considerable
expected shortfall in government financial contributions
to the general program budget. In , the Executive Com-
mittee had approved a budget for the general program of
us million, but only us million was available.  The
total funds contributed to  had reached almost
us million, but the amount received in  had fallen
to us million.  At the close of April ,  had
acquired us million less than on the same date the pre-
vious year.
As fiscal problems intensified in the s, the High
Commissioner and her officials sought out initiatives that
could bring significant savings without seriously damaging
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program delivery. Staff positions at headquarters and in
the field were reduced. In July , the number of head-
quarters posts stood at , down from  a year earlier. In
the field, positions fell from  in July , to  a
year later.  Even with zealous efforts to limit expenditures
for all sectors of  program operations, the proposed
budget for the fiscal year  still stood at nearly us
million. The  budget was first reduced to us mil-
lion but had to be reduced further to us million, dem-
onstrating the inability to raise adequate revenues to meet
the still acute program needs so clearly identified by 
personnel.
As this new century opens, financial anxiety persists and
is reflected in a plethora of decisions that have affected how
 accomplishes its mandate. Before identifying some
of them, this paper will briefly discuss the effect that the
High Commissioner who directed the Office in the past
decade has had on agency operations.
Sadako Agota became High Commissioner in January
, after her appointment by the  Secretary General
was confirmed by the . During the autumn  session
of the , she was reappointed for a two-year term, at her
request, and fulfilled her mandate at the end of the year
. Her years of service have provided much-needed con-
tinuity in leadership and direction, following the events in
 and , which resulted in the resignations of her
two immediate predecessors. Throughout her years as High
Commissioner, Mrs. Ogata strove to make  more
administratively efficient, managerially streamlined, and
fiscally responsible and accountable. According to one sen-
ior official, her style or approach was to push particular
proposals or schemes initially on a trial basis so that she
could gauge the response of the major donor governments.
If she met no significant resistance, she would persist with
her plans, but if opposition arose and intensified, rather
than entering a protracted struggle, she would make a stra-
tegic retreat.
Prior to the appointment of the present  secretary
general, Kofi Annan, some observers speculated that Sadako
Ogata was under some consideration for this highest post.
One source has speculated that, being aware of this possi-
bility, she worked more diligently than ever to reform the
operations of  as a sort of illustration of what she
might be in a position to do if she were given the opportu-
nity to address the internal problems of the  system it-
self. During her decade as High Commissioner, Mrs. Ogata
recognized the fiscal and political importance of the major
donor governments, especially that of the United States,
and did all in her power to meet their preferences in policy
and program choices. What then has been the impact of
the financial problems and Mrs. Ogata’s approach upon
the structural, administrative. and organizational opera-
tions of ?
Major donor governments have routinely criticized
many  agencies for their unprofessional management,
rampant use of ad hoc administrative practices, and even
financial waste.  has not been exempted from this
censure. As financial shortfalls have become more acute
for , the High Commissioner and her officials, ever
sensitive to the humanitarian nature of its mandate and
the deepening concerns expressed by governments about
their administrative inefficiencies, renewed their efforts to
streamline operations in virtually all areas of agency op-
erations. In April , Mrs. Ogata established a working
group to focus upon internal program management and
operational capacity. This group has subsequently been
absorbed by ’s Office of the Comptroller and Man-
agement Services but continues to monitor the operations
of the agency, constantly on the lookout for inefficiencies
and waste. On another front, to save time for Secretariat
officials to undertake other tasks, and to free up govern-
ment representatives from redundant meetings, ’s
Standing Committees on International Protection and
Administration and Finance were merged into one general
standing committee, which now meets three to four times
a year and operates as an advisory body between the an-
nual sessions of the Executive Committee. This new sys-
tem began functioning in .
At the same time that the one standing committee was
formed, the Executive Committee took steps, at the sug-
gestion of the High Commissioner, to strengthen ’s
internal comprehensive audit processes. The primary ob-
jective was to make management and administrative sys-
tems more accountable, transparent, and responsive. These
and other efforts for openness and efficiency were to some
degree triggered by the ’s own Board of Auditors and
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions, which together had indicated that there had
been little progress in rectifying several recurrent adminis-
trative issues.
The ’s Board of Auditors had also expressed concern
over the lack of coordination and controls between 
and its “implementing partners”—a term that describes the
scores of non-governmental organizations with which
 has negotiated contractual arrangements to care
for and maintain the millions of persons defined to be
within the agency’s mandate. Anxious to avoid fiscal inef-
ficiencies, the auditors and ’s Executive Committee
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have urged that the activities of contracting partners be
audited as well.
During the last three or four years, numerous reports
from  recount the intensifying work to reduce ex-
penses without losing sight of the agency’s objectives.
’s own Inspection and Evaluation Service has
adopted practices to strengthen oversight in an attempt to
pacify the ’s auditors and its own Executive Commit-
tee.  As an illustration of cost-cutting efforts,  has
re-examined the contractual relationships it had with sup-
pliers of a wide range of goods, to ensure the best possible
prices for materials used to assist refugees.
In ,  embarked upon its most extensive ini-
tiative to overhaul management and administrative prac-
tices and procedures. This ambitious exercise was intended
to streamline management, reduce staff positions at head-
quarters and in the field, introduce powerful information
systems, and above all, cut costs. In-house committees and
task forces, watched closely by member government repre-
sentatives, formulated and evaluated numerous schemes
to meet the goals of Project Delphi.
Operating on a parallel track, and at the urging of 
auditors and the Executive Committee,  has used
memoranda of understanding to formalize and place on a
more business-like footing its relations with  agencies
contracted to assist refugees.
Simultaneously, work also continued between 
and its non-governmental implementing partners to regu-
larize and formalize their cooperative operations. At the
same time, uncertainty mounted among  officials
about whether the non-governmental organizations, in fact,
could do all that was being asked of them. By the mid-
nineties, these agencies were operating as much as  per
cent of the ’s field projects.
As international voluntary agencies became a vital com-
ponent of  service delivery, having already acquired
observer status at annual meetings of the Executive Com-
mittee in many instances, they began to ask for more vis-
ibility, and possibly even influence, in  governance.
Succinctly put, these agencies sought the opportunity to
submit written presentations, and to intervene orally in Ex-
ecutive Committee deliberations, at least occasionally.
Moreover, these  partners strove to extend their ob-
server status to the three or four meetings held annually by
the Standing Committee. While recognizing that the role
of non- bodies was most significant in helping to fulfill
the mandate of , government representatives on the
Executive Committee preferred to keep governance issues
in their hands, for the most part. Nevertheless, observer
status for voluntary organizations at Standing Committee
meetings has been attained.
It is clear that the challenges facing the agency have been
enormous, and the search for adequate financial resources
and political support for programs has been a persistent goal.
Concern for the physical safety and security of humani-
tarian personnel employed by  and other  and
non-governmental agencies has mounted recently. Officials
in the field have been held hostage by bandits and terrorist
groups, and in a few deplorable instances, personnel have
lost their lives, as in Guinea, East Timor, and Chechnya.
This rise in violence has profoundly troubled the senior
managers at  as well as the member governments
that sit on the Executive Committee. Whenever possible,
field personnel are pulled out of regions known to be par-
ticularly dangerous. But if refugees and other persons in
need are to be assisted, the international humanitarian or-
ganizations must continue to take chances in order to fulfill
their humanitarian mandates. The problem continues and
is not easily resolved.
Conclusion
One should not be left entirely with an impression of de-
spair and pessimism. Without doubt,  has had, and
continues to have, financial, administrative, and political
impediments to conquer. Moreover, the forces and factors
that cause refugee movements are still all too apparent.
 and many humanitarian voluntary organizations
are being confronted by a seemingly endless series of forced
population movements, whether in the Balkans, sub-
Saharan Africa, or Asia. Political instability, which can cause
refugee outflows, persists in many parts of the world and
can generate refugee flows surprisingly quickly, given the
appropriate catalysts. Bleak as this picture may be, ,
its mandate, and its objectives continue to have broad sup-
port from the vast majority of governments today, despite
imperfections. Moreover, the agency stands as a useful il-
lustration of how the concept of multilateralism can be
operationalized.
The multilateral character of the efforts to meaningfully
address the global refugee phenomenon are a half-century
old now and are firmly in place. No government today ques-
tions the need for collective action where refugees need as-
sistance and protection. The establishment of  fifty
years ago, together with its expanding mandate over time,
has its basis in the premises of functionalist multi-
lateralism.  The approach has been applied to the refugee
phenomenon because it requires cooperation from virtu-
ally all governments, if durable solutions are to be achieved.
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As a multilateral vehicle,  constitutes the centrepiece
of an international “regime” or the formal intergovernmen-
tal apparatus intended to formulate and accomplish hu-
manitarian programs necessitated by widespread violence
and turmoil.
This recognition on the part of governments that 
fulfills a necessary function does not, of course, alleviate
the anxiety on several fronts that continues to be experienced
by these same governments, as well as by the High Com-
missioner and other humanitarian voluntary organizations.
Despite all its problems,  operations continue to
expand, to address the chronic and the newer challenges
posed by the global refugee phenomenon. Like complex
bureaucratic organizations everywhere,  in its sec-
ond half-century will continue to undergo managerial and
administrative modifications in an effort to more ad-
equately fulfill its mandate. The degree to which it meets
the objectives set for it by governments or in-house plan-
ners will depend upon available finances, the political will
of member governments, and the scope of the world’s refu-
gee situation.
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